主題: 美國對習近平中國的政策    rdrcntr:317 關鍵字:
張貼時間: 2015-09-25 00:00:00
司徒文 ip: X.X.X.X
內容:
U.S. Policy toward Xi Jinping's China 美國對習近平中國的政策
作者/司徒文(William A. Stanton)
國立清華大學亞洲政策中心主任
2009-2012 美國在台協會台北辦事處處長
2006-2009 美國駐韓國首爾大使館副館長
2003-2005 美國駐澳洲坎培拉大使館副館長
1978-2012 美國國務院

2015年9月19日台灣安保協會舉辦「兩岸關係與亞太區域和平」國際研討會。
下文只節錄原文部分,閱讀研討會的會議手冊的全文、有助深入了解過去數十年美國的中國政策。
研討會全部文章以及影檔登在台獨聯盟的網站:www.wufi.org.tw/tjsf/
/林茗顯 製作網頁 2015/09/25,2015/11/21 rvsd


”U.S. Policy toward Xi Jinping's China”開頭的一段摘要:
Abstract

U.S. policy toward China has been consistently short-sighted. The geostrategic argument for relation with China as leverage against Moscow collapsed with the Soviet Union, and today China and Russia are close strategic partners. Concrete U.S. policy benefits of cooperation with China are hard to find, and arguments that trade with China would bring about political change proved to be wrong. Some corporations have certainly benefitted from moving poduction to China but American workers have only lost jobs, while U.S. companies are increasingly finding China an inhospitable environment. U.S. policy has largely ingnored Taiwan's interests, underestimated its potential and never foresaw the democracy it would become. Misunderstanding and ignorance of Taiwann persits, even among Taiwan experts. Meanwhile, many experts underestimate China's wealthy elite demonstrate little confidence in China's future as they move abroad, educated their children and buy homes in the West, and move their monney overseas.

美國對中國的政策,一貫地短視。將美中關係作為對付莫斯科的槓桿的地緣戰略論,與蘇聯一起崩解,今日中國與俄羅斯是親密的戰略伙伴。與中國合作的美國政策的具體利益,難以找到,與中國貿易將帶來政治改變(指中國的和平演變)的論述,證明是錯誤的。一些公司轉移生產到中國,的確獲利,但是美國工人只有喪失工作,而美國的公司越來越發現中國是不友善的環境。美國的政策多半忽視台灣的利益,低估它的潛力,而且從未預期它將成為民主。即使是台灣專家,對台灣的誤解與無知繼續存在。許多專家輕估:中國的富有菁英移居外國、教育其子女、在西方買房子、錢進海外,所展示的對中國的未來少有信心的現象。

The Geostrategic Argument Proved Wrong
經不起檢驗的地緣戰略論


First, U.S. strategic thinking about China has been consistently short-sighted. President Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for example, were ready to abandon Taiwan to the PRC in order to separate China from the Soviet Union until they received a double blow in 1950: the Sino-Soviet Mutual Defense Treaty and the North Korean attack on South Korea, which we now know was blessed by both Stalin and Mao.

美國有關中國的戰略思考,一貫地短視。舉例, 杜魯門總統和時任國務卿的艾奇遜(Dean Acheson),為了分離中國與蘇聯, 已作好準備拋棄台灣、奉送給中華人民共和國,直到在1950年遭逢雙重打擊才打消此想法:中蘇簽訂共同防禦條約,以及北韓入侵南韓,現在我們已經知道那是經過史達林和毛澤東默許的。

It was President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, however, who most fervently pursued the geostrategic argument that improved U.S. relations with China would serve to counter-balance Soviet power and the Soviet threat. That assumption continued to broadly guide U.S. policy until the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and especially the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

尼克森和季辛吉,最熱烈奉行「改善美、中關係、用以反制蘇聯力量與威脅」地緣戰略論。這個戰略假設,持續廣泛指導美國對中政策,直到1989年11月柏林圍牆倒塌,尤其是蘇聯在1991年12月解體。

This assumption of Nixon and Kissinger, the first of whom actually knew little about China, and the second, initially at least, nothing at all, proved entirely false over the longer term. At the time of the Shanghai Communiqué, an impoverished and militarily weak China also had its own geostrategic reasons to try to counterbalance vastly superior Soviet military forces. From the moment the Shanghai Communiqué was signed, however, on February 28, 1972, China had newly found leverage against the Soviet Union which actually allowed the two countries to begin improving their relationship.

尼克森和季辛吉,其實對中國的了解很少,至少一開始時,幾乎完全無知,他們的戰略假設,長期看來,根本錯誤。在簽上海公報時,貧困、軍力弱的中國,也有其戰略理由,試圖制衡大幅佔優勢的蘇聯的軍事力量。在簽上海公報那一刻,在1972年2月28日,中國已經發現對抗蘇聯的槓桿,這確實促使兩國開始改善雙方的關係。

Benefits to the U.S. Economy?
對美國經濟有利?


Many have argued that trade with China has certainly at least benefitted the U.S. economy. Wang Yang, Vice Premier of China and co-chair of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington, issued a statement on June 22 entitled “U.S.-China Dialogue Pays Dividends.” He cited as evidence that Chinese direct U.S. investments since 2009 had increased fivefold, adding more than 80,000 American jobs.

很多人辯護,與中國貿易,至少有利於美國的經濟。中國副總理、「美中戰略經濟對話」的共同主席汪洋,6月22日在華盛頓發表一篇「中美對話支付紅利」的聲明中舉證,自2009年起,中國對美國的直接投資成長了5倍,為美國增加超過8萬個工作。

Yet a study by Will Kimball and Robert E. Scott for the Economic Policy Institute on December 11, 2014 found that “growing U.S. trade deficits with China between 2001 and 2012 eliminated 2.9 million U.S. jobs and that more than three-fourths of the jobs lost (nearly 2.3 million, 77.1%) were in the manufacturing sector.” They also cited similar studies with similar results, and pointed out that the loss of jobs and China’s devaluation of its currency had also driven down U.S. wages.

不過,Will Kimball和Robert E. Scott在2014年12月11日為美國經濟政策研究學會(Economic Policy Institute)所作的研究報告發現,「自2001年到2012年,不斷成長的美國對中國的貿易赤字,導致美國失去了290萬個工作,超過四分之三(約230萬,77.1%)喪失的工作、是製造部門的工作」。他們,引用了其他類似研究的類似結論,在報告中也指出,工作流失與中國貨幣貶值,也驅降了美國的薪資。

Ignoring and Underestimating Taiwan
輕忽與低估台灣


唐耐心(Nancy Bernkopf Tucker)在《海峽風雲錄》Straight Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China(2009)一書中寫到:
”Kissinger apparently only became interested in China when he realized how seriously the president [Nixon]took efforts to improve relations with China...Kissinger dimissed Taiwan as inconsequential, little more than a domestic political pawn. Throughout his negotiations with the Chinese, Kissinger would consistently minimize the significance of Taiwan as an issue for Beijing and as an impediment to progress." Although Kissinger proudly noted in his book On China that he has visited China more than 50 times (mostly it would seem as a paid consultant), he as to this day never visisted Taiwan.

「季辛吉(尼克森政府國務卿Kissinger)當他認知,尼克森總統顯然認真努力改善與中國的關係,才引起他的中國的興趣...季辛吉視台灣微不足道、僅僅是國內的政治籌碼。季辛吉與中國談判的全程中,他一貫地將台灣對中國的重要性極小化,視為只是進展的阻礙。」雖然季辛吉在他的《On China》書中,自豪地指出,他訪問中國超過50次以上, (顯然大部分,他是領取報酬的顧問身份),但到今天為止,他從沒訪問過台灣。

It is no wonder that one of the key sentence in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqe--"The United States acknoledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China."--had no factual basis, in part because Kissinger and Nixon intentionally excluded any U.S. China experts from ehir negotiations with the PRC. It was certainly true in 1972 that the "governments" on both sides of the Strait belived there was only one China, but to say that "all Chinese" thought the same is more than a bit of a reach because no one ever asked them and, if they had, in Taiwan the answer would have been more mixed, and on the mainland most Chinese probably gave little thought to much more than their next meal. It is a historiecaol tragedy that in dealing with a very weak, very poor China, we did not strike a better deal for Taiwan.

一點也不足為奇,在1972年的上海公報上的關鍵句子,「美國認知台灣海峽兩岸的所有中國人都堅持只有一個中國,台灣是中國的一部份」,完全沒有事實基礎,一方面因為季辛吉和尼克森,在和中華人民共和國談判時,刻意排除所有中國問題專家的參與。的確,1972年海峽兩邊的政府都認為只有一個中國,但是如果說「所有中國人」都這樣想,就有點超過,因為從來沒有人徵詢過他們的意見,如果他們曾徵詢,在台灣的回應,可能正反都有,而在中國大部分中國人可能很少想到這比下一餐更重要。與弱而且窮的中國談判,我們沒有為台灣爭取到更好的交易,是歷史悲劇。

曾任國務卿的舒茲(George P. Shultz)對於美國該如何與中國交往提出提出最正確的作法, 他把這作法寫在1993年發行的回憶錄《亂中取勝:我的國務卿歲月》 (Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State)裡的序文。
舒茲特意否定中國地緣戰略的重要性,認為那不過是「在觀念上扭曲我們看待美、中關係的折射鏡」,而且要是那麼做的話,「美國決策者幾乎無可避免地會變得太過看重中國的利益,並隨著中國的喜怒哀樂起舞」;舒茲還建議,「一旦太過強調雙邊關係,把建立關係當成唯一優先目標的話,就難免會犯下錯誤」,而真正「優質的雙邊關係,應該要能有效替兩國解決根本性問題,以創造共同利益為出發點」。
舒茲提到自己在任內與中國交往時,嚴格採取從現實面出發的政策:
「我們把中國視為一個被自我意識型態羈絆的跛腳巨人,只要中國自我糾結於意識型態,中國和美國之間的合作關係就無可避免會受到抑制,使得美、中雙方對彼此互動關係的期待,與實際上的付出存在一條難以跨越的鴻溝。我們將盡一切可能維持與中國的雙邊關係,也不放棄任何改善雙邊關係的機會;但是我們不會在和中國人交往的時候,放棄我們的基本價值與處事原則;而這就是總統在應對蘇聯時所必須謹記的教訓。」 我也期待,未來美國在面對中國時,能夠持續堅持這樣的政策